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Introduction 
 Numerous studies and theories have been devoted to answering questions surrounding 
voting in legislative settings and voter choice on Election Day. A legislator is faced with 
balancing the role of a delegate with the role of a trustee in the legislature, weighing votes based 
on both their conscience and the wishes of their constituents. Sometimes legislators do not 
consider either of these, as they are pressured to “toe the party line” on major legislative issues. 
What happens when a bill on the floor causes all of these different pressures to collide, 
particularly on an issue as contentious as the death penalty?  After the Furman v. Georgia 
decision in 1972, states had to deal with decisions on reinstating capital punishment laws struck 
down by the Supreme Court. Most of the changes states have made to their death penalty statutes 
since Furman have come from legislative action, but a situation arose in Washington in 1975 in 
which the death penalty was reinstated via popular vote after the legislature had refused to pass a 
new capital punishment statute. A similar situation occurred in 2015 in the state of Nebraska, 
when for the first time, the state legislature succeeded in repealing the state’s capital punishment 
statute over the governor’s veto. Both the majority of the Nebraska legislature and the governor 
are Republicans, and the state which they serve is known to be generally conservative. The 
voters made their displeasure with the legislature know the following November, after a ballot 
referendum challenging the legislature’s abolition of the death penalty resulted in the voters 
deciding to overrule the legislature and uphold the state’s death penalty system. The events in 
Washington in 1975 and Nebraska in 2015 will be the subjects of this paper. 
 This paper will examine the possible factors that could explain the Nebraska and 
Washington legislatures’ actions on death penalty policy as well as the apparent divide between 
the legislatures and their constituents on the issue. With the help of legislative records, 
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newspapers, and Krehbiel’s pivotal politics model, the legislative history and votes on the death 
penalty bills will be examined to determine why the legislatures would enact such broad changes 
on a controversial issue that did not seem to have been supported by their constituents. In 
addition, election return data from the ballot questions will be used to compare constituent votes 
on death penalty policy with the votes of their legislators. The anticipated outcome of this 
analysis is that through the pivotal politics model, ideology will be shown to be the main factor 
in determining votes on death penalty policy. In addition, the election returns should indicate that 
on a district level, public opinion on the death penalty was incongruent with the actions of the 
state legislators.  
Background 
The Death Penalty and Furman v. Georgia 
 The death penalty has existed in the United States since the time of the Revolution, and it 
had been present in the British colonies in North America as a part of British law (Scafidi 1973, 
pp. 682-683). While calls for abolition of the death penalty predated the formation of the United 
States, the first major abolition movement took hold in the mid to late 19th century as Maine, 
Michigan, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin all abolished the death penalty before 1890 (Scafidi 
1973, pp. 683-685). The state of Iowa abolished the death penalty in 1872, but this decision was 
reversed in 1878 (Scafidi 1973, pp. 683-685). In 1897, Congress reduced the federal death 
penalty to cases of murder, rape, and treason (Scafidi 1973, p. 685). From 1890-1920, eight more 
states abolished the death penalty, but five states would reinstate the death penalty before the 
Furman decision (Scafidi 1973, p. 685). In 1964, New York limited and Oregon abolished the 
death penalty in their respective states, the final two states to do so before 1972 (Scafidi 1973, p. 
685). 
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 Furman had been convicted of murder and sentenced to death in Georgia after an 
attempted burglary ended with a shot being “fired through a closed door when Furman, running 
away, tripped over a wire” (Scafidi 1973, p. 697). Two other defendants sentenced to death for 
rape, one from Georgia and one from Texas, had their cases consolidated and heard on appeal 
with Furman’s by the Supreme Court (Scafidi 1973, pp. 697-698). In the case of Furman v. 
Georgia, the Court decided 5-4 that the death penalty applied in these cases was unconstitutional 
(Furman v. Georgia 1972, further Furman). The opinion issued in the case was per curiam, with 
each of the five justices in the majority issuing their own opinions (Furman). In the per curiam 
opinion, the Court ruled that the death penalty as applied in these three cases “constitute cruel 
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments” (Furman, at 
240). Justice Stewart was careful to note that despite the opinions of Justices Brennan and 
Marshall, the constitutionality of the death penalty itself was not under the purview of this 
decision, and the Supreme Court has never ruled that the death penalty is per se unconstitutional 
(Furman, at 308). What the majority had agreed was unconstitutional had been the death penalty 
as it was currently practiced, especially granting great latitude to juries that had caused the death 
penalty to be “so wantonly and so freakishly imposed” (Furman, at 310). Justice Douglas also 
noted, citing a report from the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration 
of Justice, that the death penalty had been “disproportionately imposed, and carried out on” poor 
and minority defendants (Furman, at 249-250). 
 The immediate effect of the Furman decision was to commute the death sentences of the 
three defendants petitioning the case. However, the decision effectively nullified death penalty 
statutes across the country, as the death penalty as currently practiced in the states had been 
found unconstitutional. The states then had the task of deciding whether or not to reinstate the 
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death penalty without much guidance in the Furman opinions as to what framework for capital 
punishment the Court would deem constitutional. Nine states had abolished the death penalty 
before the Furman decision, and one state, North Dakota, did not reinstate its death penalty after 
it was struck down by the Court in 1972 (Death Penalty Information Center, further DPIC). 
Instead, the North Dakota Legislature repealed the remnants of the death penalty from state law 
in 1973 (DPIC). The remaining 40 states reinstated their death penalty laws at some point after 
the Furman decision, and the process and timing of reinstatement of the death penalty varied 
from state to state.  
 Table 1 presents the dates and methods of reinstatement used by the states to institute 
new death penalty laws following the Furman decision: 
Table 1 
Timing and Methods of State Death Penalty Reinstatement After Furman v. Georgia 
 
State Year of 
Reinstatement 
Method of Reinstatement 
Alabama 1976 Legislative action 
Arizona 1973 Legislative action 
Arkansas 1973 Legislative action 
California 1974 Constitutional amendment by voter initiative, then legislative action 
Colorado 1975 Legislative referendum, approved by voters 
Connecticut 1973 Legislative action 
Delaware 1974 Legislative action 
Florida 1972 Legislative action 
Georgia 1973 Legislative action 
Idaho 1973 Legislative action 
Illinois 1974 Legislative action 
Indiana 1973 Legislative action 
Kansas 1994 Legislative action 
Kentucky 1975 Legislative action 
Louisiana 1973 Legislative action 
Maryland 1978 Legislative action 
Massachusetts  1982 Legislatively referred constitutional amendment, passed by voters 
Mississippi 1974 Legislative action 
Missouri 1975 Legislative action 
Montana 1974 Legislative action 
Nebraska 1973 Legislative action 
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Nevada 1973 Legislative action 
New Hampshire 1991 Legislative action 
New Jersey 1982 Legislative action 
New Mexico 1979 Legislative action 
New York 1973 Legislative action 
North Carolina 1977 Legislative action 
Ohio 1974 Legislative action 
Oklahoma 1973 Legislative action 
Oregon 1978 Ballot initiative 
Pennsylvania 1974 Legislative action 
Rhode Island 1973 Legislative action 
South Carolina 1974 Legislative action 
South Dakota 1979 Legislative action 
Tennessee 1974 Legislative action 
Texas 1974 Legislative action 
Utah 1973 Legislative action 
Virginia 1975 Legislative action 
Washington 1975 Ballot initiative 
Wyoming 1977 Legislative action 
Source: DPIC 
 
The overwhelming majority of states reinstituting the death penalty did so through legislative 
action. There were five states, however, where popular votes were used to pass new death 
penalty laws. In two of those states, Colorado and Massachusetts, the state legislatures referred 
legislation and a constitutional amendment, respectively, which the voters in each state passed.  
In California, a 1972 state Supreme Court decision ruled the state’s death penalty statute 
unconstitutional under the state constitution (DPIC). An initiative petition placed a state 
constitutional amendment on the ballot to declare the death penalty constitutional in California, 
and voters overruled the state supreme court and passed the amendment in November 1972 
(DPIC). The legislature would enact a new death penalty law under this amendment in 1977 
(DPIC). In two states, Oregon and Washington, ballot initiative petitions were used to reinstate 
each state’s death penalty system.  
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 Many of the 40 states which reenacted their death penalty statutes after the Furman 
would soon alter their statutes again, some due to state courts finding the laws unconstitutional 
and others due to legislative alterations to the statutes. In 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court would 
again hear a case involving Georgia’s death penalty law, this time to determine whether the new 
framework for death penalty statutes adequately addressed the issues raised in Furman. While 
five cases involving five separate state death penalty laws were announced in 1976, the case of 
Gregg v. Georgia is the historically important case for the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
death penalty’s constitutionality after Furman (Gregg v. Georgia 1976, further Gregg). In 
upholding Georgia’s death penalty statute, the Court held that the Georgia law’s provisions 
requiring the jury to take into account the “character or record” of individual defendants, 
required the jury to find at least one aggravating factor in a crime, and required automatic 
appellate court review to protect against “random or arbitrary imposition of the death penalty” 
made the law constitutional and adequately addressed the issues in Furman (Gregg, at 206-207). 
This ruling provided a framework for the states on structuring a constitutional death penalty 
system. The Court did not uphold all of the death penalty laws that came before it in 1976, and in 
Woodson v. North Carolina the Court ruled that mandatory death sentences were 
unconstitutional (Woodson v. North Carolina 1976).  
Since 1976, the Court has made numerous changes to its death penalty jurisprudence, 
such as preventing the exclusion of potential jurors based on race and prohibiting the execution 
of defendants under the age of 18 (Batson v. Kentucky 1986; Roper v. Simmons 2005). In 
addition, the Court has held that the execution of intellectually disabled is unconstitutional, and it 
has prohibited the use of outdated medical standards in assessing a defendant for intellectual 
disability (Atkins v. Virginia 2002; Moore v. Texas 2017). The Furman and Gregg decisions in 
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the 1970’s were two of the most important Supreme Court cases ever heard on criminal 
punishment, and the additional cases listed, among others, have helped shape how the death 
penalty is practiced in the United States. In the time since the Gregg decision, nine states that 
had reinstated the death penalty and are shown in Table 1 have abolished it in their states through 
either legislative action or state Supreme Court decisions. Table 2 lists the dates and methods of 
abolition in these states: 
Table 2 
Timing and Methods of State Death Penalty Abolition After Furman v. Georgia 
 
State Year of 
Abolition 
Method of Abolition 
Connecticut 2012 Legislative action 
Delaware 2016 Legislative action 
Illinois 2011 Legislative action 
Maryland 2013 Constitutional amendment by voter initiative, then legislative action 
Massachusetts  1984 Legislative referendum, approved by voters 
New Jersey 2007 Legislative action 
New Mexico 2009 Legislative action 
New York 2004 Legislative action 
Rhode Island 1984 Legislative action 
Source: DPIC 
 Two interesting occurrences involving state death penalty laws since the Furman 
decision are described below. In 1975, the state of Washington attempted to reinstate its death 
penalty statute for the second time since the Furman decision. Disagreement among the state 
House of Representatives and state Senate resulted in the citizens settling the debate via ballot 
initiative. In 2015, an effort by the legislature of Nebraska to repeal the death penalty led to a 
legislative showdown with the governor that had to be settled by voters via a referendum in 
November 2016. These situations can provide insight into legislative voting decisions on death 
penalty issues as well as other topics such as the legislator-constituent relationship.  
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Washington 
 The forty-fourth Washington Legislature convened for its first session on January 13, 
1975 (House Journal of the Forty-Fourth Legislature, p. 1, further House Journal). Washington 
has an interesting structure for its bicameral state legislature. Representatives and senators are 
elected from the same districts and constituencies, with each of the 49 legislative districts 
electing two members of the House of Representatives and one member of the Senate 
(Washington State Legislature). On the day the session opened, two bills were introduced that 
sought to reinstate the death penalty in the state of Washington. House Bill 80 (HB80) and 
Senate Bill 2007 (SB2007) both sought to reinstate the death penalty in Washington for certain 
cases of first degree murder (House Journal, p. 20; Senate Journal: Forty-Fourth Legislature, p. 
41, further Senate Journal). The mentions of HB80 in the legislative record are few, and the bill 
does not appear to have gained much traction in the House. On April 11, 1975, HB80 was 
reported as a substitute bill and referred to the House Committee on Rules to schedule it for 
second reading (House Journal, p. 852). This appears to be where the bill was stopped, as there 
is no further mention of it in the House Journal. 
 In the Senate, SB2007 had much greater success than HB80 had in the House. On April 
1, 1975, the bill was reported from the Senate Judiciary Committee with the majority 
recommending passage, and the bill was sent to the Senate Committee on Rules to schedule the 
second reading (Senate Journal, p. 869). On April 18, 1975, after numerous amendments were 
considered to the bill, SB2007 passed the Senate by a vote of 33-14, with two members excused 
(Senate Journal, pp. 1008-1015). SB2007 contained a clause that would have automatically 
placed the bill before voters in the form of a referendum on the November 1975 ballot (United 
Press International, April 20, 1975, further UPI). The bill was passed alongside a companion bill, 
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which would make life imprisonment the maximum penalty for murder and also contained a 
provision for a referendum (UPI, April 20, 1975). The passage of both of these bills would have 
allowed the people to decide in two referenda whether life imprisonment or the death penalty 
should be the maximum sentence in the state, and if both referenda would have passed, the vote 
on the death penalty would override the vote on life imprisonment (UPI, April 20, 1975). A 
referendum of SB2007 would have made the death penalty the sentence for “killing a uniformed 
policeman or fireman, mass murders, murder for hire, killing to cover up another crime, murder 
in connection with rape, or murder committed by an inmate serving a life sentence” (UPI, April 
20, 1975). 
 The House received the Senate-passed version of SB2007 on April 21, 1975, and the bill 
was sent to the Judiciary Committee (House Journal, p. 936). On May 7, 1975, the House 
Judiciary Committee reported the bill, and it was sent to the Committee on Rules to schedule for 
second reading (House Journal, 1213-1214). The version of the bill passed by the committee was 
significantly different than the bill passed by the Senate, as the reported bill would have made 
the death penalty mandatory in the case of murder only for inmates currently serving a life 
sentence (UPI, May 8, 1975). In the other cases originally stated in the bill, such as killing a law 
enforcement officer, the committee changed the maximum sentence to life without parole (UPI, 
May 8, 1975). When the bill reached the floor, the coalition that supported the bill was similar to 
the one that had supported HB80. Unlike HB80, however, SB2007 never received a vote on final 
passage on the House floor. Instead, opponents were able to use a procedural vote to prevent its 
passage.  On May 20, 1975, a vote was taken to refer SB2007 back to the House Committee on 
Rules, and this vote passed 58-37 with three members not voting (House Journal, p. 1357). This 
vote effectively killed the bill, and it marked the second time since the Furman decision that the 
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House refused to pass Senate-approved legislation reinstating the death penalty in Washington 
(Brazier pp. 23-27). 
 Reports from the Seattle Times indicate that Representative Tilly, one of the co-sponsors 
of HB80, may have been anticipating the House’s refusal to pass a bill reinstating the death 
penalty. On March 16, 1975, it was reported that Representative Tilly was planning a petition 
drive to place an initiative on the November that would reinstate the death penalty in Washington 
(Associated Press, March 16, 1975, further AP). Tilly cites legislative inaction on the death 
penalty as one of the reasons for the initiative, and the article also cites that Governor Dan Evans 
had long been an opponent of the death penalty, making him likely to have vetoed any proposed 
reinstatement (AP, March 16, 1975). After waiting to see how the legislature handled several 
criminal justice bills, Tilly and his supporters began petitioning on a large scale on June 6, 1975 
(Zahler, 1975). One month later, on July 6, 1975, it was reported that the Washington Secretary 
of State’s Office had accepted the petition and verified enough signatures to place the 
reinstatement of the death penalty on the November 1975 ballot as Initiative 316 (AP and UPI, 
July 6, 1975). On November 4, 1975, voters in Washington passed Initiative 316 and reinstated 
the death penalty by a vote of 69.1% in favor and 30.9% against (Secretary of State, State of 
Washington). 
 
Nebraska 
 In January 2015, the 104th Nebraska Legislature opened for its first session.  Nebraska’s 
legislature is unique among state legislatures in the United States. Not only is it the only non-
partisan state legislature in the United States, but it is also the country’s only unicameral state 
legislature (Clerk of the Legislature 2014, p. 247). Despite being elected on non-partisan ballots, 
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party registration among state senators in 2015 put the party balance of the 49 members at 35 
Republicans, 13 Democrats, and 1 Independent (NET 2015). On January 14, 2015, State Senator 
Ernie Chambers, the only independent senator in the legislature, introduced bill number LB268 
which sought to change the maximum criminal sentence in Nebraska from death to life 
imprisonment without parole (104th Nebraska Legislature, p. 154, further Legislative Journal). 
After a large number of amendments were considered to the bill, LB 268 passed the legislature 
on May 20, 2015 by a vote of 32-15-2 (Legislative Journal, p. 1739).  
Six days later, on May 26, 2015, Republican Governor Pete Ricketts vetoed the bill and 
returned it to the legislature without approval (Legislative Journal, pp. 1869-1871). In his veto 
message, the governor argued that the state would not be saving a significant amount of money 
from eliminating the death penalty system, and he cited support from the “overwhelming 
majority of Nebraskans who support the death penalty” as a factor in his decision (Legislative 
Journal, p. 1869-1871). The legislature met the following day, May 27, to consider a vote to 
override the governor’s veto. Despite the objections of the governor, the legislature voted 30-19 
to override the veto of LB268, with 16 Republicans voting to override (Legislative Journal, pp. 
1896-1897). The two Republican senators who had originally voted “present” on LB268 voted 
“no” on the override vote, and two Republican senators who had voted “yes” on LB268 switched 
their vote to “no” for the override vote (Legislative Journal, pp. 1896-1897). 
 Following the vote to override the governor’s veto, a petition drive started to place 
LB268 on the November 2016 ballot for a referendum vote. Nebraskans for the Death Penalty, a 
group supported by the governor, was able to gain enough signatures to prevent the law from 
going into effect and place the referendum on the November 2016 ballot, and the petition was 
certified by the Secretary of State on October 16, 2015 (Hammel 2015). Opposition to the 
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referendum was led by the group Nebraskans for Public Safety and would later include the group 
Retain a Just Nebraska (Hammel 2015). Legal challenges were raised against the petition, the 
most notable of which was heard by the Nebraska Supreme Court on May 25, 2016 (Duggan, 
May 26, 2016). This lawsuit dealt with the meaning of the word “sponsor” in a state law 
requiring a group collecting signatures for a referendum to disclose the names of any sponsors of 
the petition effort (Duggan, May 26, 2016). Governor Ricketts had given $200,000 to 
Nebraskans for the Death Penalty in order to assist with their petition drive, but his name did not 
appear on the list of sponsors submitted with the petition (Duggan, May 26, 2016). On July, 9, 
2016, the court announced its decision that Governor Ricketts’ name did not need to appear on 
the petition as a sponsor (Duggan, July 9, 2016). Citing a decision from 2003, the court decided 
that a “sponsor” is someone taking “statutory responsibilities” for a petition after it has been 
filed, and the governor did not meet that specification (Duggan, July 9, 2016). Thus, the 
referendum was allowed to appear on the November 2016 ballot. In November 2016, voters in 
Nebraska decided in Referendum 426 to repeal LB268 by a vote of 60.64% to 39.36%, allowing 
the death penalty to remain as a criminal punishment in Nebraska (Secretary of State, State of 
Nebraska 2016, p. 60, further Official Reports). 
 
Theory and Literature Review 
 The events in Nebraska and Washington are interesting in that politicians in both states 
had a notable lack of party unity on the death penalty. This suggests that the political actors in 
these situations could have been voting based on individual ideology rather than a party line, and 
it is also possible that legislators were casting their votes based on their perception of the opinion 
of their constituents. The pivotal politics model, proposed by Dr. Keith Krehbiel, provides a 
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framework for analyzing legislative voting based on legislator ideology. This framework can be 
used to examine the votes taken on the death penalty to determine if ideology can explain the 
observed intra-party disagreements. In addition, the votes of constituents on the death penalty 
can be compared to those of their elected legislators and compared to existing representation 
literature on how public opinion effects government policy change.  
Given the available data, Nebraska will be the focus of the pivotal politics analysis in this 
paper. This model is based in part on the median voter theorem, which was first formalized by 
Duncan Black in his 1948 paper On the Rationale of Group Decision-making. This theorem 
makes observations on proposals offered under a majoritarian voting procedure. To set up the 
operation of the theorem, each voter (in this case, each legislator) is placed along a 
unidimensional liberal-conservative scale based on where that voter’s ideal policy point lies. 
This theory relies on each legislator having a single-peaked ideal point on this continuum. 
Among options available on a given issue, each legislator will have their own preference 
ordering of these options based on where the options lie on the continuum compared to the 
legislator’s ideal point. The main observation of this theorem is that whatever policy outcome is 
preferred by the median voter can gain a majority vote against any other proposal (Black 1948). 
Given a situation of multiple proposals, “only one motion can get a simple majority over every 
other” (Black 1948, p. 26). Therefore, when a vote on a proposal is taken, “the motion 
adopted…would be that corresponding to the median optimum” (Black 1948, p. 29). This theory 
is useful for this analysis, for it acts as a framework that is expanded by the pivotal politics 
model. 
 Applying the median voter theorem in a more direct manner, Krehbiel’s pivotal politics 
theory models voting in a legislative setting. Legislators are placed on a liberal to conservative 
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unidimensional scale, ordered by their common-space ideal point scores. Similar to Black, this 
model relies on each legislator having a single-peaked ideal point on the continuum, meaning the 
goal of spatial comparisons among varying proposals is to determine which is closest to a given 
legislator’s ideal point on the continuum (Krehbiel 1998, p. 22). The median voter can easily be 
identified in this model as the legislator whose place along the continuum is equal to one half of 
the total number of legislators in the chamber. Since Nebraska’s legislature has 49 members, the 
senator in the twenty-fifth position moving left to right along the continuum would be the 
median voter.   
In addition to simply examining the median voter on the continuum, the pivotal politics 
theory adds several key “pivots” to the model that determine whether or not a proposal becomes 
law. The first pivotal vote to add to the model is the executive’s position on the continuum. The 
executive, in this case the governor, determines the position of the other two pivotal votes on the 
continuum. Since Governor Ricketts is a conservative Republican, his ideal point will fall to the 
right of the median. Assuming all legislators vote according to their place along this continuum, 
the legislator who would cast a deciding vote on invoking cloture is the filibuster pivot (Krehbiel 
1998, p. 23). The rules of the legislature require “a two-thirds majority of elected members” to 
invoke cloture, meaning thirty-three votes are required to invoke cloture (Rules of the Nebraska 
Unicameral Legislature, p. 52). With the governor falling to the right of the median senator and 
Republicans in the majority in the legislature, the filibuster pivot will fall to the left of the 
median voter on the continuum. Thus, the filibuster pivot will be the thirty-third voter on the 
continuum counting from right to left. The final pivotal vote on the continuum is the veto pivot. 
In Nebraska, a three-fifths majority of the legislature is required to override the veto of the 
governor, meaning thirty senators must vote in favor of overriding a veto for the bill to become 
15  Derek Whiddon 
 
law (Nebraska State Constitution). The veto pivot falls on the same side of the median voter as 
the governor. This placement makes sense, as the coalition of overriding a conservative 
governor’s veto would start with the senator furthest to the left on the continuum and continue 
moving right at least through the thirtieth senator’s ideal point. 
This model seeks to explain observed voting results in legislative settings and can even 
be used to predict future votes based on available information on where the proposals would fall 
on the spectrum. There are strong assumptions made in terms of the information available to 
each of the players on this continuum. Each of the legislators “know each other’s preferences, 
understand who the pivotal voter is in any given setting, and adopt optimal strategies 
accordingly” (Krehbiel 1998, p. 25). Each legislator is seeking solely to maximize their utility in 
the voting process and will vote for the proposal that is closest to their ideal point. Applying this 
model to Nebraska yields the following framework (Based on Krehbiel 1998, p. 23):   
Figure 1 
Pivotal Politics in Nebraska 
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In this framework, point “f” represents the filibuster pivot, the thirty-third senator from the right 
of the continuum. Point “m” represents the median voter who has the ideal point that is the 
median of the legislature. Point “v” represents the veto pivot, the thirtieth senator from the left of 
the continuum. Point “g” represents the governor’s ideal point on the continuum.   
 Theoretically, the pivotal politics model would hold when there is weak party unity in 
government. There is reason to believe that this could be the case in Nebraska.  The legislature is 
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officially non-partisan, and members are elected on a non-partisan ballot. The state parties are 
able to endorse candidates in elections, but the chamber itself remains non-partisan. It could be 
the case that in the Nebraska Legislature, there is not as much pressure to “toe the party line” as 
there is in partisan legislatures. This would lend itself to pivotal politics analysis, as senators’ 
votes would more accurately reflect their personal positions on issues rather than the party’s 
position on issues. In addition to operating as non-partisan, the legislature is also the country’s 
only unicameral state legislature. Senators in Nebraska do not have to anticipate or cater to the 
actions of another chamber, only the position of the governor. This also aids pivotal politics 
analysis, as it enables all of the relevant individuals to be modeled on a single, unidimensional 
continuum rather than two (one for each chamber of a bicameral legislature). Thus, Nebraska’s 
situation as a non-partisan, unicameral legislature lends itself to the pivotal politics model. 
 The final portion of the model is supporting its validity.  The main test of the model 
relevant to this analysis is the gridlock zone, which Krehbiel states is the hypothesis with “the 
greatest direct theoretical importance” (Krehbiel 1998, p. 63). The gridlock zone occurs on the 
continuum between the veto pivot and the filibuster pivot, and the test of the gridlock zone is a 
test of the validity of these two pivots. The model dictates that if the current state of the law falls 
in this zone on the continuum, then there is no proposal to change that law that can pass and 
become law. Any proposal in this interval will either be filibustered by the filibuster pivot or 
vetoed by the governor, and the veto pivot would not vote for a proposal that takes the state of 
the law further from their ideal point. The gridlock zone hypothesis states that the placement of 
the veto and filibuster pivots along this continuum that explains legislative gridlock, not party 
politics or public mood (Krehbiel 1998, p. 63). The test of the gridlock hypothesis is the gridlock 
interval’s effect on legislative productivity in the U.S. Congress. Krehbiel pulls measures of 
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legislative productivity and data on congressional legislation from Cameron and Howell (1996) 
and Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (Krehbiel 1998, p. 63). In the regression, Krehbiel 
controls for the gridlock interval, government regime change (changing from unified to divided 
or vice versa), and public mood, with mood broken down into activist mood, domestic policy 
mood, and tax mood (Krehbiel 1998, p. 70). Krehbiel finds that when testing the gridlock 
interval, public mood, and regime change hypotheses, the gridlock interval has a statistically 
significant negative effect on legislative productivity, and neither the public mood nor change in 
government regime have significant impacts (Krehbiel 1998, p. 70). These results would support 
application of this model to the Nebraska situation.  Based on the results of the referendum, 
citizens in Nebraska are clearly in favor of maintaining the state’s death penalty system.  
However, the moderate Republicans in the legislature still partnered with Democrats to pass 
LB268, and their ideal point scores in the pivotal politics model may explain why the legislature 
voted against the public mood in this instance. 
 Despite Krehbiel’s findings, the statistical significance of the gridlock zone has not been 
supported by subsequent research, but a recent study by Gray and Jenkins (2017) has attempted a 
new kind of analysis regarding legislation related to the gridlock zone.  Rather than examining 
all categories of laws passed by Congress, the authors propose separating bills into “ideological” 
and “non-ideological” categories based on content (Gray and Jenkins 2017, p. 12). The ideal 
points of the legislators come from DW-NOMINATE scores, and the laws examined in this 
paper are the “landmark” laws selected in Mayhew (2005) from the 80th through 113th 
Congresses (Gray and Jenkins 2017, pp. 5-7). The categories of laws coded as ideological in the 
analysis are economic, social, military, and international relations/action, and the social category 
includes bills relating to criminal law (Gray and Jenkins 2017, pp. 12-13). The non-ideological 
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category is the remainder of the “landmark” laws that do not fit into one of these four categories 
(Gray and Jenkins 2017, pp. 12-13). This OLS regression controls for the presence of united 
government, policy mood, GDP growth, war, and the gridlock interval as determined by the DW-
NOMINATE scores (Gray and Jenkins 2017, p. 15). Gray and Jenkins find that on ideological 
votes, the gridlock interval has a statistically significant negative effect on legislative 
productivity (Gray and Jenkins 2017, p. 15). This result empirically supports the pivotal politics 
model. The authors argue that since the legislators are being aligned based on ideological scores, 
it would make theoretical sense that votes on ideological issues would be better described by the 
pivotal politics model (Gray and Jenkins 2017, pp. 24-25). They also note that using ideological 
scores for legislators while incorporating legislation that was non-ideological could be why 
previous studies had found little empirical support for the pivotal politics model (Gray and 
Jenkins, pp. 24-25). Gray and Jenkins’ results further support a pivotal politics analysis for 
Nebraska. The non-partisan nature of the legislature could create weaker party unity and make a 
vote on a death penalty bill more reflective of legislator ideology.   
 Another area of study that is of interest for both Nebraska and Washington is 
responsiveness of government to public opinion. Studying the federal government, Stimson, 
Mackuen, and Erikson (1995) examine the effect of public opinion on policy change, measuring 
the effect of public opinion liberalism on public policy liberalism. Comparing the four main 
decision-making entities in the federal government (president, House, Senate, Supreme Court), 
the researchers find the House of Representatives to be the most responsive to changes in public 
opinion, followed by the president, the Senate, and the Supreme Court (Stimson, Mackuen, and 
Erikson 2015). These results make theoretical sense, as House members are directly elected by 
the smallest constituencies, while Supreme Court justices are only answerable to the public 
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indirectly and only during the confirmation process. The House should be more responsive than 
the president, as the president is technically not elected by the electorate but rather the Electoral 
College, and it is possible to win the presidency without winning the popular vote. However, it is 
likely that these levels of responsiveness would all be increased for state governments including 
Nebraska and Washington. While the legislature could show similar responsiveness to Congress, 
the governor and state Supreme Court justices are likely to be more responsive than their federal 
counterparts. This is due to the fact that justices (in some states) and the governor are elected by 
a statewide popular vote rather than nominations to the U.S. Supreme Court or the Electoral 
College. This puts all of the branches in similar electoral situations and could make them more 
responsive to public opinion. 
 There are studies at the state level that have sought to measure policy responsiveness of 
state governments. A section of Page and Shapiro (1983) compares responsiveness of state 
governments, Congress, the president, and the courts. Their analysis indicated that of the policies 
analyzed, “state policies turned out to be congruent most often of all” (Page and Shapiro 1983, p. 
183). Page and Shapiro attribute this to varying ideologies by state and to the fact that the issues 
examined in their data set were moral issues, capital punishment among them (Page and Shapiro 
1983). Other studies have supported the conclusion that state governments are overall generally 
responsive to public opinion. There is an argument that could be made of reverse causality, 
where elite actors in the state government are able to manipulate public opinion in support of 
their favored policies. This would make it seem as if public opinion was informing government 
policy, allowing elite actors to justify the policy. Wright, Erikson, and McIver (1987) presented 
detailed findings on public policy and public opinion at the state level. The researchers find 
strong correlation between liberalism of public opinion and liberalism of state policy change 
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(Wright, Erikson, and McIver 1987, p. 989). In addition, the researchers use a two-stage least 
squares regression to test the possibility of reverse causality (Wright, Erikson, and McIver 1987, 
p. 992). The results of this regression indicate that it is public opinion that is affecting state 
policy change and that the relationship “is not seriously contaminated by the reverse process” 
(Wright, Erikson, and McIver 1987, p. 993). 
 In terms of public opinion surrounding elections, there is a question of whether elite 
decision makers are able to anticipate what issues will be salient at the time of the next election. 
This is dependent on their ability to gauge and track changes in public opinion. For example, 
legislators in Nebraska knew that Governor Ricketts planned on vetoing LB268, but it was 
unclear whether they knew that a referendum election was likely to occur. Much of the research 
suggests that as policy salience increases the effect of public opinion on policy increases, so it is 
possible that lawmakers might have underestimated the salience that the referendum would have 
on Election Day one and a half years after the veto was overridden. There was some reporting on 
override votes against the governor were hurting some Republican senators during their primary 
campaigns. Overrides on the death penalty, tax reform, and licenses for child immigrants seemed 
to affect the primary election margins for certain Republican senators who voted against the 
governor on these issues (Stoddard 2016). One incumbent Republican, Senator Nicole Fox, lost 
her primary election, although she was not appointed to the legislature until August 2015 and 
thus did not vote on LB268 (Stoddard 2016). It is possible that the legislature’s non-partisan 
status was not enough to shield incumbents from constituents who supported the governor’s 
position on the death penalty.  
 It would be difficult to measure responsiveness and representation as these studies do. 
There are simply not enough polling data available at the state level that specifically seeks to 
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measure support for the death penalty. Much of the information is available in national polls 
from organizations like Gallup. The most direct way that voters express their opinion on 
government is through voting. A direct way to compare how the legislator voted and how the 
citizens in the district fall along the spectrum on the death penalty is to look at the election 
returns for the counties in each senator’s district. A comparison could then be made between how 
the senator voted on LB268 and how the constituents feel the senator should have voted on 
LB268. Vote choice is also the basis for the common-space ideal point scores. Thus, it may be 
possible to analyze ideal point scores for the districts that each senator represents and scale them 
just like the ideal point scores for the legislators. This would allow for comparisons between the 
ideology of the legislators and the ideology of their districts. The ideological scores for the 
districts can also be placed on a continuum to see how well these scores align with the election 
results from each district. 
 
Washington 
Data 
 The analysis for Washington is mainly qualitative, drawing from both legislative records 
and newspaper reports. The daily legislative journals of both the Washington House and Senate 
were accessed online through the Ohio State University Library. The news archives of the Seattle 
Times were used to provide context of the debate surrounding Initiative 316. In terms of the 
pivotal politics model, ideology scores are not available for the session in 1975. In addition, the 
election returns available from the Washington Secretary of State are not available at the district 
or precinct level, preventing a comparison of the district results on Initiative 316 to the respective 
senator and representative votes on the bills in the legislature. However, the legislative journals 
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do contain records of the roll call votes on each of the bills. Since the districts and constituencies 
for the House and the Senate are the same, the votes of the legislators representing the same 
districts can be compared. This could reveal differences between senators and representatives in 
gauging public opinion and can be compared to the literature on representation.   
 
Analysis 
 The vote on SB2007 in the Washington Senate does not appear to have been a party-
influenced vote. Of the Democrats in the Senate, 18 voted in favor and 10 voted against, and of 
the Republicans in the Senate, 15 voted in favor and four voted against. The vote in the House to 
refer SB2007 back to the Committee on Rules followed a more partisan line. Among Democrats 
in the House, 50 voted in favor of referral and 10 voted against, and among Republicans in the 
House, eight voted in favor while 27 voted against. The lack of district or precinct level returns 
on Initiative 316 prevents the comparison of the votes of the legislators to those of their districts.  
However, given the structure of the Washington Legislature, it is possible to compare the votes 
of representatives and senators who represent the same districts. Table 3 displays the votes on 
SB2007 of both the representatives and senators from each district, and comparing these votes 
can help reveal differences in ideology among legislators representing the same districts but in 
different chambers of the legislature: 
Table 3 
Washington Senate and House Votes on SB2007 
 
District Senator Vote on 
SB2007 
Rep. 1 Vote to Refer 
SB2007 
Rep. 2 Vote to Refer 
SB2007 
1 Van Hollebeke N Bender N Brown Y 
2 Bottinger Y Ehlers Y Erickson Y 
3 Keefe Y M. Hurley N May N 
4 Day Y Knowles N Kuehnle N 
5 R. Lewis Y Luders N McCormick Y 
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6 Guess Y Bond N Pardini N 
7 Wilson N Haussler Y Schumaker N 
8 Benitz Y Boldt Y Cochrane Y 
9 Donohue Y Amen Y Patterson N 
10 Wanamaker Y Fortson N Wilson Y 
11 Grant N Bagnariol N Shinpoch Y 
12 Sellar Y Curtis N Tilly N 
13 Washington N Flanagan Y Hansen NV 
14 Matson E Seeberger Y Whiteside N 
15 Morrison Y Deccio NV Newhouse N 
16 Jolly Y Hayner N Kilbury N 
17 Henry Y Laughlin Y Zimmerman Y 
18 Talley Y Paris Y Thompson Y 
19 Bailey Y Charette Y E.P. Smith Y 
20 Odegaard N Jastad Y Kalich Y 
21 Gould N Fischer Y Nelson N 
22 H. Lewis Y Bausch Y Hendricks N 
23 Walgren Y Randall Y R. Smith Y 
24 Sandison Y Conner Y Savage Y 
25 Knoblauch Y Gaspard Y Sawyer Y 
26 Beck Y Hanna Y Hawkins Y 
27 Stortini Y Adams Y Wojahn Y 
28 Newschwander Y Haley N Jueling N 
29 Rasmussen Y Gallagher Y Parker Y 
30 von Reichbauer Y Gaines Y Warnke Y 
31 Herr N Lysen N Valle Y 
32 Francis Y Perry Y Williams Y 
33 Cunningham N Barnes N Lee N 
34 Buffington Y Ceccarelli Y Leckenby N 
35 Ridder N Chatalas NV O'Brien Y 
36 Murray N Eikenberry N Sommers Y 
37 Fleming N Eng Y Maxie Y 
38 Mardesich Y King Y Martinis Y 
39 Woody E Clemente Y Moon Y 
40 Peterson Y Berenston N Hansey N 
41 Clarke Y Dunlap N Polk N 
42 Goltz N Becker Y Moreau Y 
43 McDermott N Douthwaite Y Peterson N 
44 North Y Charnley Y G. Hurley Y 
45 Bluechel N Chandler Y Matthews N 
46 Scott Y Blair Y Greengo N 
47 Pullen Y North Y Sherman Y 
48 Jones Y Freeman N Gilleland N 
49 Marsh Y Bauer N McKibbin Y 
Sources: Senate Journal, pp. 1008-1015; House Journal, p. 1357 
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Given the nature of the votes in each chamber, a “no” vote on passage in the Senate and a “yes” 
vote to refer the bill in the House are both equivalent to voting against the bill and against the 
death penalty. Conversely, a “yes” vote on passage in the Senate and a “no” vote on referral in 
the House are both equivalent to voting in favor of the bill and in favor of the death penalty. 
Within the House, both representatives from the same district cast the same votes on SB2007 for 
30 of the 49 legislative districts. When the Senate is included, the number drops significantly. 
Both representatives and the senator from a district cast parallel votes in only 12 of the 49 
districts. Only three of these 12 districts had legislators from different parties, and those were 
districts four, 16, and 40. This suggests possible differences among legislators from the same 
district over ideology or over the opinion of their constituents on the death penalty. 
 Numerous opinions were given by various individuals and groups in Washington 
regarding both the proposed bills to reinstate the death penalty and Initiative 316. As noted 
earlier, Governor Evans was an opponent of the death penalty and threatened to veto any bills 
reinstating the death penalty. In March 1975, the governor made his opposition to the bills clear 
by arguing that the death penalty was not a deterrent to crime and arguing that if the legislature 
was serious about the death penalty, then the bills should have included provisions to force a 
legislative vote on each application of the death penalty in criminal cases (Anderson, 1975). In 
addition to the governor, state Attorney General Slade Gorton also opposed the legislature’s 
proposals. Gorton urged the legislature to await guidance from the Supreme Court regarding 
constitutional procedures for the death penalty, and he states that the money spent on death 
penalty appeals would be better spent on more effective law enforcement as a deterrent to crime 
(AP, March 21, 1975). The Washington Chapter of the ACLU also cited the absence of evidence 
of a deterrent effect, opposing both the legislative bills and the push for the initiative (AP, March 
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19, 1975). Some religious organizations voiced opinions on Initiative 316, with the Quakers in 
the state opposing the initiative citing moral objections and lack of a deterrent effect (AP, 
October 19, 1975). However, the Puget Sound Baptist Association supported the initiative, 
believing the government should have the authority to impose death as a punishment for crime 
(AP, October 29, 1975). The Seattle Times itself urged passage of Initiative 316, arguing it was a 
way for the electorate to force the government to action on rising crime in the state (Editorial 
Board of The Seattle Times, 1975). Despite the numerous individuals and groups against 
Initiative 316, the crime control argument seemed more persuasive with voters on Election Day 
as they voted to overrule their state House of Representatives and reinstate the death penalty in 
Washington.   
 
Nebraska 
Data 
 Data on LB268 and Referendum 426 came from several sources.  Procedural information 
on the bill, such as roll call votes and the governor’s veto message, are available in the 
legislature website in the Legislative Journal. Articles from the Omaha World Herald were also 
used to provide background and context. Voting data for state legislative elections and 
Referendum 426 can be found in the Revised Official Reports of the Board of State as well as on 
the Nebraska Secretary of State’s website (Nebraska Secretary of State-Election Results, 2016). 
The Secretary of State’s website reports the election results in both county and precinct level 
format. With a list of precincts in each legislative district provided by the Secretary of State’s 
Office, it was possible to determine how each of the legislative districts in Nebraska voted in 
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Referendum 426. These data can be used to compare the votes taken by the legislators on LB268 
and their constituents’ votes in the referendum, allowing for inferences regarding representation. 
 In order to form a pivotal politics analysis, a measure of legislator ideology was 
necessary to determine the rank order of the legislators on the continuum. Certain interest groups 
release legislator scorecards that list how often legislators’ votes align with the values of the 
interest group. Of the available scores for Nebraska legislators, the American Conservative 
Union (ACU) provided voting histories on selected bills that are most likely to reveal 
conservative to liberal voting behavior among legislators (ACU 2015). The percentage of 
conservative to liberal voting behavior reported on the ACU’s yearly scorecards provides the 
rank order for the Nebraska Legislature used in this analysis. 
 Similar to the rank order provided by the ACU scorecards for state legislators, ideological 
measures can be used to estimate the ideology of a particular legislative district. Dr. Chris 
Tausanovitch and Dr. Christopher Warshaw have used responses to the Cooperative 
Congressional Election Survey to estimate the scaled ideology of both congressional and state 
legislative districts (Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2013). Condensing the surveys into a “roll-call 
matrix,” the researchers scale responses into ideal points ranging from [-1,1], where a score of -1 
represents the liberal end of the spectrum and a score of 1 represents the conservative end of the 
spectrum (Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2013). These data were updated for state legislatures 
following redistricting after the 2010 census, and the data are reported on the American Ideology 
Project website. The ideal point scores for each of the state legislative districts in Nebraska can 
be used not only as a tool for a pivotal politics analysis but also as a method to gauge how 
responsive legislators were to the perceived interests of their constituencies. 
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Analysis 
 The roll call votes on LB268 and the override vote indicate weak party unity among 
Republicans in Nebraska on the issue of the death penalty. Both of these votes involved a 
bipartisan coalition of senators, and 18 of the 35 Republicans in the legislature in 2015 voted in 
favor of LB268. Only 16 of the 35 would vote in favor of the override, as Senators Johnson and 
Murante voted against the override after voting for LB268’s initial passage. While the votes 
show unanimity among the Democratic caucus in the legislature, the evident disagreement 
among Republicans on repealing the death penalty and overriding the governor shows that 
political parties were not voting bloc coalitions on this vote. It is more likely, as the following 
tables will show, that the vote can be explained by the senators’ ideology rather than their party 
identifications. There were four sets of scores available from the ACU for the 104th Nebraska 
Legislature.  Each year, the reports from the ACU list the legislators’ scores for selected bills and 
amendments voted on in that calendar year. In addition to the yearly score, each report also lists 
the running lifetime averages for each legislator aggregated across the yearly reports. In a 
legislator’s first year of service, the yearly score and lifetime average would be the same. The 
104th Nebraska Legislature opened in 2015 and adjourned in 2016, with the ACU report for each 
year listing the yearly score as well as the running lifetime averages. Of the four available scores, 
the most accurate representation of the pivotal politics model came from the 2015 yearly score.   
 Table 4 displays the rank order of senators from liberal to conservative based on the ACU 
2015 report: 
Table 4 
Nebraska Pivotal Politics Table 
 
Rank Senator (score) Vote on 
LB268 
Vote on 
override 
1 Haar (0) Y Y 
28  Derek Whiddon 
 
2 Hansen (0) Y Y 
3 Kolowski (0) Y Y 
4 Mello (0) Y Y 
5 Nordquist (0) Y Y 
6 Pansing Brooks (0) Y Y 
7 Cook (7) Y Y 
8 Harr (7) Y Y 
9 Morfeld (7) Y Y 
10 Bolz (8) Y Y 
11 Campbell (8) Y Y 
12 Krist (8) Y Y 
13 Howard (9) Y Y 
14 Chambers (13) Y Y 
15 Crawford (13) Y Y 
16 McCollister (14) Y Y 
17 Baker (F) (20) Y Y 
18 Hadley (20) Y Y 
19 Johnson (20) Y N 
20 Schumacher (20) Y Y 
21 Gloor (21) Y Y 
22 Seiler (21) Y Y 
23 Kuehn (23) N N 
24 Davis (27) Y Y 
25 Sullivan (M) (27) Y Y 
26 Scheer (29) N N 
27 Coash (M*) (33) Y Y 
28 Smith (33) N N 
29 Stinner (33) N N 
30 Friesen (V) (38) N N 
31 Hilkemann (40) Y Y 
32 Kolterman (42) Y Y 
33 Williams (43) Y Y 
34 Schilz (45) P N 
35 Garrett (53) Y Y 
36 Hughes (54) N N 
37 Craighead (57) N N 
38 Lindstrom (64) Y Y 
39 Riepe (64) N N 
40 Watermeier (70) N N 
41 Ebke (V*) (71) Y Y 
42 Larson (73) P N 
43 Murante (75) Y N 
44 Bloomfield (79) N N 
45 Brasch (79) N N 
46 Groene (87) N N 
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47 Kintner (87) N N 
48 Schnoor (91) N N 
49 McCoy (92) N N 
Note: The governor’s score for 2015 was 44%. 
Sources: ACU 2015; Legislative Journal, p. 1739 and pp. 1896-1897 
The senator scores represent the percentage of times the senator voted with the ACU position on 
the selected bills and amendments in the ACU 2015 report. Next to the senator names are both 
the expected pivots, denoted in bold, and the actual pivots, denoted in bold with an asterisk. The 
governor’s score, listed below the table, was calculated using the governor’s decision to sign or 
veto the bills selected in the ACU 2015 report that passed the legislature. The final two columns, 
containing the vote on LB268 and the vote to override the governor’s veto, are the measure of 
the accuracy of the model. The senators are ranked top to bottom in the table from liberal to 
conservative. This model assumes that voting would occur beginning with the most liberal 
senator and continue in order with the most conservative senator voting last.  If the pivotal 
politics model was an exact explanation of the votes in Nebraska, all of the “yes” votes would 
appear in order beginning at the top of the table, followed by all of the “no” votes. This setup 
would lead to Senator Sullivan being the median voter on LB268 as denoted on the table. As the 
25th senator in rank order, Sullivan would be the final vote needed for the initial passage of 
LB268 if all senators above would have voted “yes.” The two “present” votes on LB268 would 
be irrelevant in this scenario as long as they did not occur before Sullivan’s vote. In addition, 
under this hypothetical example, the 30 votes to override the governor’s veto would be the 30 
votes beginning with the most liberal an ending with the senator in rank order position 30. This 
would make Senator Friesen the expected veto pivot as denoted in the table.   
 It is clear in the Table 4 that the pivotal politics model using the ACU’s 2015 scores is 
not a perfect explanation of the votes in the legislature. However, the model does accurately 
account for a large portion of the votes cast, especially on LB268. An “error” in this case would 
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be defined as a senator with the opportunity to act as a “pivot” in the voting order declining to do 
so and passing the opportunity to the next senator. In the vote on LB268, Sullivan is the 
hypothesized median voter.  However, Senator Kuehn’s “no” vote prevented Sullivan from 
casting the 25th vote required for passage. This passed the opportunity to Senator Scheer, who 
declined to pivot and voted “no” on LB268. It was Senator Coash who cast the deciding 25th vote 
on LB268, making him the actual median voter on LB268. Since two senators declined to pivot 
and Coash is two spots away from the hypothesized median position, this model has two errors 
for LB268. The vote to override the governor’s veto is a less accurately modeled in the table. 
Five “no” votes occur in the table before the hypothesized veto pivot, preventing Friesen from 
pivoting. By voting “no,” Friesen would have declined to pivot even if given the opportunity.  
After three more out of place “no” votes, the first senator that had the opportunity to pivot was 
Senator Riepe. Riepe declined to pivot, as did Senator Watermeier. Senator Ebke cast the 
deciding 30th vote, making Ebke the actual veto pivot for the override vote. Since 11 “no” votes 
were cast before Ebke, the model for the override vote contains 11 errors. For comparison, the 
yearly scores for 2016 contained three errors for the vote on LB268 and 10 errors to override the 
governor’s veto. Interestingly, when averaging the 2015 and 2016 yearly scores, only one error is 
present for the vote on LB268 and only eight errors are present for the vote to override the 
governor’s veto.   
 As seen in the results of Referendum 426, a majority of voters in Nebraska disagreed 
with the legislature’s decision and repealed LB268. Table 5 displays the votes of each senator on 
LB268, the votes of each senator on the vote to override, and the results of the referendum in 
each senator’s district: 
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Table 5 
Nebraska Senator Votes on LB268 and District Results 
 
District Senator Vote on 
LB268 
Vote on 
Override 
District 
Result 
1 Watermeier N N Repeal 
2 Kintner N N Repeal 
3 Garrett Y Y Repeal 
4 Hilkemann Y Y Repeal 
5 Mello Y Y Repeal 
6 Craighead N N Retain 
7 Nordquist Y Y Retain 
8 Harr Y Y Retain 
9 Howard Y Y Retain 
10 Krist Y Y Repeal 
11 Chambers Y Y Retain 
12 Riepe N N Repeal 
13 Cook Y Y Retain 
14 Smith N N Repeal 
15 Schnoor N N Repeal 
16 Brasch N N Repeal 
17 Bloomfield N N Repeal 
18 Lindstrom Y Y Repeal 
19 Scheer N N Repeal 
20 McCollister Y Y Repeal 
21 Haar Y Y Repeal 
22 Schumacher Y Y Repeal 
23 Johnson Y N Repeal 
24 Kolterman Y Y Repeal 
25 Campbell Y Y Retain 
26 Hansen Y Y Repeal 
27 Coash Y Y Retain 
28 Pansing Brooks Y Y Retain 
29 Bolz Y Y Retain 
30 Baker Y Y Repeal 
31 Kolowski Y Y Repeal 
32 Ebke Y Y Repeal 
33 Seiler Y Y Repeal 
34 Friesen N N Repeal 
35 Gloor Y Y Repeal 
36 Williams Y Y Repeal 
37 Hadley Y Y Repeal 
38 Kuehn N N Repeal 
39 McCoy N N Repeal 
40 Larson P N Repeal 
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41 Sullivan Y Y Repeal 
42 Groene N N Repeal 
43 Davis Y Y Repeal 
44 Hughes N N Repeal 
45 Crawford Y Y Repeal 
46 Morfeld Y Y Retain 
47 Schilz P N Repeal 
48 Stinner N N Repeal 
49 Murante Y N Repeal 
Sources: Legislative Journal, p. 1739 and pp. 1896-1897; Nebraska Secretary of State-Election Results, 2016 
This table shows that 24 of the senators cast at least one vote that differed from the referendum 
result in their districts. Two of the senators, Johnson and Murante, voted “yes” on LB268 and 
switched their votes to “no” on the decision to override the governor’s veto. Both of their 
districts voted to repeal LB268, so their reversal on the vote to override aligned them with the 
votes of their constituents. It is possible that the votes of some legislators on LB268 hurt them in 
their reelection bids in 2016. While the public may have forgotten about votes taken on LB268 in 
May 2015 by the time of the November 2016 election, Referendum 426 kept the issue of the 
death penalty and LB268 salient throughout the election cycle. Table 6 displays the 13 
incumbents who ran for re-election in Nebraska in 2016:  
Table 6 
Nebraska Senator Votes, District Results, and Re-Election Results 
 
District Senator Party Vote on 
LB268 
Vote on 
Override 
District 
Result 
Re-Election Result 
1 Watermeier R N N Repeal Won (Unopposed) 
3 Garrett R Y Y Repeal Lost 
9 Howard D Y Y Retain Won 
11 Chambers I Y Y Retain Won 
15 Schnoor R N N Repeal Lost 
19 Scheer R N N Repeal Won (Unopposed) 
23 Johnson R Y N Repeal Lost 
29 Bolz D Y Y Retain Won 
31 Kolowski D Y Y Repeal Won 
33 Seiler R Y Y Repeal Lost 
43 Davis R Y Y Repeal Lost 
45 Crawford D Y Y Repeal Won 
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49 Murante R Y N Repeal Won (Unopposed) 
Sources: Legislative Journal, p. 1739 and pp. 1896-1897; Nebraska Secretary of State-Election Results, 2016; 
Official Reports 
Of the five incumbents that lost their re-election bids, three cast both votes that were not aligned 
with the referendum results in their districts. Senator Schnoor cast both votes in alignment with 
the referendum results in District 15 but still lost reelection. Senator Johnson changing his vote 
to “no” on the vote to override aligned with the referendum results in District 23, but he still lost 
his reelection campaign. However, Senator Murante similarly switched to “no” on the vote to 
override and won reelection, albeit unopposed. Interestingly, Senators Crawford and Kolowski 
both won reelection despite casting both votes on LB268 and the vote to override opposite of the 
referendum results in their districts. The results shown in Table 6 indicate that despite the 
presence of Referendum 426 on the ballot, the senators’ votes on LB268 did not seem to have a 
major impact in the district races.   
 With scores available from the American Ideology Project to rank the ideology of each 
district based on survey responses of voters, it is possible to compare the rank order of the 
senators with the rank order of their districts based on their respective scores. Table 7 shows the 
comparison between each district’s rank order and the respective senator’s rank order: 
Table 7 
Ideological Rank Order of Senators and Districts (Liberal to Conservative) 
 
District  Senator 
Rank 
District 
Rank 
1 40 38 
2 47 13 
3 35 41 
4 31 8 
5 4 20 
6 37 1 
7 5 9 
8 8 7 
9 13 10 
10 12 29 
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11 14 2 
12 39 24 
13 7 19 
14 28 42 
15 48 33 
16 45 23 
17 44 45 
18 38 25 
19 26 37 
20 16 32 
21 1 21 
22 20 47 
23 19 28 
24 32 34 
25 11 12 
26 2 31 
27 27 11 
28 6 5 
29 10 4 
30 17 26 
31 3 39 
32 41 36 
33 22 40 
34 30 48 
35 21 22 
36 33 44 
37 18 18 
38 23 43 
39 49 27 
40 42 49 
41 25 30 
42 46 35 
43 24 16 
44 36 46 
45 15 14 
46 9 3 
47 34 15 
48 29 17 
49 43 6 
Sources: ACU 2015; Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2013 
Only one district, district 37, has both the senator and the district rank order equal.  The average 
distance between the senator and district ranks is just over 13 with a correlation of 0.325, but it is 
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possible that this overstates differences in ideology among the senators and their districts. The 
surveys used to construct the scores for each district all had samples of less than 60 participants. 
However, when analyzing the referendum results, it appears that these district ideal point scores 
may be an accurate description of each district’s position on LB268.  Table 8 ranks each district 
on the same liberal to conservative spectrum as the senators are ranked in Table 4:   
Table 8 
Ideological Rank Order of Districts and Referendum Results 
 
Rank District District 
Result 
1 6 Retain 
2 11 Retain 
3 46 Retain 
4 29 Retain 
5 28 Retain 
6 49 Repeal 
7 8 Retain 
8 4 Repeal 
9 7 Retain 
10 9 Retain 
11 27 Retain 
12 25 Retain 
13 2 Repeal 
14 45 Repeal 
15 47 Repeal 
16 43 Repeal 
17 48 Repeal 
18 37 Repeal 
19 13 Retain 
20 5 Repeal 
21 21 Repeal 
22 35 Repeal 
23 16 Repeal 
24 12 Repeal 
25 18 Repeal 
26 30 Repeal 
27 39 Repeal 
28 23 Repeal 
29 10 Repeal 
30 41 Repeal 
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31 26 Repeal 
32 20 Repeal 
33 15 Repeal 
34 24 Repeal 
35 42 Repeal 
36 32 Repeal 
37 19 Repeal 
38 1 Repeal 
39 31 Repeal 
40 33 Repeal 
41 3 Repeal 
42 14 Repeal 
43 38 Repeal 
44 36 Repeal 
45 17 Repeal 
46 44 Repeal 
47 22 Repeal 
48 34 Repeal 
49 40 Repeal 
Sources: Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2013; Nebraska Secretary of State-Election Results, 2016 
A vote to “Retain” LB268 would be considered a liberal position, and a vote to “Repeal” LB268 
would be considered a conservative position. This table is a fairly accurate representation of the 
expected alignment of “Repeal” and “Retain” votes based on the rank of ideology, with only 
three votes appearing to be outliers. These would be the “Retain” result in District 13 and the 
“Repeal” results in Districts 4 and 49. This table suggests that, at least on the issue of the death 
penalty and LB268, these district ideal point scores are fairly accurate in representing each 
district’s position.   
 
Discussion of Results 
 The votes in the Nebraska and Washington legislatures as well as the pivotal politics 
table for Nebraska suggest that the votes on the death penalty bills in both states were based on 
ideology rather than party platforms or constituent opinion. In Washington, the voting roll calls 
in the House and the Senate do not indicate a party-line vote on SB2007. In addition, the 
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Republican caucus in the Senate voted to pass SB2007 while the Republican caucus in the House 
voted against allowing SB2007 to proceed on the floor. A similar dynamic can be found in 
Nebraska, where the Republican governor and Republican-majority legislature disagreed on 
LB268. These situations indicate weak party unity on the issue of the death penalty and a lack of 
influence of the state parties over the votes. In addition to weak party voting, the legislators’ 
votes do not appear to have been based on public opinion in their constituencies. This is most 
evident in the results of the ballot Initiative 316 in Washington and Referendum 426 in 
Nebraska. 
 Ideology, then, was likely an influential factor in the votes on SB2007 and LB268. This 
can be seen in Table 4 containing the pivotal politics analysis. With only two errors, this is a 
fairly accurate model of the initial vote on LB268 and supports ideology as a main factor in the 
decision of the legislators. The vote to override the governor’s veto, however, is less accurately 
modeled in Table 4. The override vote model contains eleven errors, and this is likely due to the 
five additional senators required to override a veto in Nebraska compared to passing the original 
bill. The additional votes leave more room for errors to occur, and it seems that the model is less 
accurate at accounting for votes on the conservative half of the spectrum. There were also four 
additional “no” votes on the override vote than on the original passage vote, with two senators 
switching their votes from “yes” on original passage to “no” on the vote to override and two 
senators switching their votes from “present” on original passage to “no” on the vote to override. 
Despite the larger number of errors for the vote to override, the small number of errors on the 
original vote on LB268 combined with the intra-party disagreement in both Nebraska and 
Washington indicate that ideology was a main factor in determining state death penalty policy. 
Thus, the first main conclusion of the analysis is that ideology was a main factor in determining 
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the votes of legislators on SB2007 and LB268. This result supports the pivotal politics model, as 
the process for explaining the vote on LB268 in Nebraska was fairly accurate. 
 As mentioned above, the passage of Initiative 316 and the “repeal” result in Referendum 
426 indicate that constituents disagreed with the results of the legislative action on the death 
penalty. Table 5 displaying the results of Referendum 426 in each district compared to the 
senators’ votes on LB268 further illustrates this point. With almost half of the senators casting 
votes incongruent with the results in their districts, it seems that constituent opinion on the death 
penalty was secondary to ideological differences among policymakers. The second main 
conclusion from the analysis is that there is clear incongruence between constituent and 
legislator opinions on the death penalty, and these differences were significant enough to cause 
citizens to use the ballot question elections to overrule the legislature on the death penalty.  
This result and the situations in Nebraska and Washington seem to contradict the findings 
of Stimson et al. and Erikson et al. in terms of responsiveness of government entities to public 
opinion. In Washington, it was the state Senate that voted congruently with public opinion as 
expressed in the initiative results, while the state House and governor both held the position 
opposite the majority of voters. In addition, it was the governor rather than the legislature in 
Nebraska that held the position of a majority of voters. However, the unique nature of both 
legislatures likely makes comparison to the two studies questionable. The fact that senators and 
representatives in Washington share the same legislative districts as well as the fact that each 
district has two representatives in the state House makes the Washington legislature significantly 
different from the structure of the U.S. Congress studied in Stimson et al. In addition, the 
unicameral nature of Nebraska’s legislature is also different from Congress, and these 
differences make comparison with the Stimson study hard to support.  
39  Derek Whiddon 
 
An unexpected result of this analysis was the indication from Table 7 that notable 
ideological differences existed in Nebraska between the senators and the districts they represent. 
However, this is also a questionable observation given the possible inaccuracy of the ideology 
scores for the districts and senators. The scores for each are based on different criteria, as the 
district scores are based on survey responses and the senator scores are based on legislative 
voting records. In addition, while Tables 4 and 8 support the accuracy of each set of scores in 
determining the voting order, this does not mean that a comparison between the scores would be 
accurate. For example, the votes of the districts by ideology in Table 8 may correctly show the 
more liberal districts voting to retain LB268 and the more conservative districts voting to repeal 
LB268, but the number of districts voting to repeal the law could hide errors in the rank order of 
these districts. In addition, in Table 4, the number of more liberal senators voting “yes” on 
LB268 could hide inaccuracies in the rank order of these senators. Possible inaccuracies are even 
more likely given the fact that some legislators have the same ACU percentage score but still 
must have different numerical rankings. Given these potential inaccuracies, the implications of 
Table 7 are questionable. 
The two main conclusions of this analysis have implications for state death penalty 
policy. Weak party unity on ideological issues such as the death penalty make can make state 
parties ineffective influencers of legislative votes, and weak party unity can also inhibit 
governors who may want to influence the vote of legislators of their own party. As seen in 
Nebraska, depending on the overall ideology of the legislature compared to the governor, it is 
possible for a legislature to limit the governor’s influence as an institutional actor on death 
penalty policy. In addition, there are also implications for current death penalty states where 
legislators may want to abolish capital punishment. In states where there are referendum and 
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initiative processes available to citizens, it will be difficult for legislators to abolish the death 
penalty absent strong constituent support for the death penalty. However, it can be hard for 
legislators to anticipate the reaction of constituents to death penalty laws without state-level 
public opinion polls. This problem is not unique to death penalty laws, but without knowledge of 
public opinion on the issue, it can make it difficult for legislators to make major ideological 
changes to the state laws. Direct democracy options enable citizens to overrule state legislative 
action, and bills could also fail to pass if legislators are unwilling to vote for major policy 
changes if they are unsure of how constituents will react. Thus, the two conclusions of this 
analysis give some insight into the challenges of ideological lawmaking at the state level. 
 
Conclusion 
 In Nebraska and Washington, the voters were clearly the most influential actors in 
determining state law on the death penalty in these cases. This analysis suggests that ideology 
can fairly accurately explain the intra-party differences observed over state death penalty policy 
in Nebraska and Washington. While this analysis supports the pivotal politics model, this 
analysis does show that the vote to override the veto in Nebraska is less accurately explained by 
ideology. This suggests that factors besides ideology had a greater role in the vote to override the 
governor’s veto than on the vote to originally pass LB268. The comparison of the referendum 
results to the votes in the legislature suggest that the actions of the legislature were incongruent 
with public opinion, something that may have been difficult for the legislators to foresee. For 
states that have direct democracy options such as referendum and initiative elections, citizens 
rather than the legislature or governor seem, from these two cases, to hold the greatest influence 
over state death penalty policy. Thus, it will be difficult for a legislature in these states to abolish 
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the death penalty without major public support, regardless of what the partisan balance of 
government happens to be. While each state’s structure of government and aspects of direct 
democracy may differ, the death penalty will remain an ideologically contentious issue that will 
be debated in all three branches of government as well as the court of public opinion.  
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